To come now to the particulars of the true liberty of a subject;that is to say,what are the things which,though commanded by the sovereign,he may nevertheless without injustice refuse to do;we are to consider what rights we pass away when we make a Commonwealth;or,which is all one,what liberty we deny ourselves by owning all the actions,without exception,of the man or assembly we make our sovereign.For in the act of our submission consisteth both our obligation and our liberty;which must therefore be inferred by arguments taken from thence;there being no obligation on any man which ariseth not from some act of his own;for all men equally are by nature free.And because such arguments must either be drawn from the express words,"I authorise all his actions,"or from the intention of him that submitteth himself to his power (which intention is to be understood by the end for which he so submitteth),the obligation and liberty of the subject is to be derived either from those words,or others equivalent,or else from the end of the institution of sovereignty;namely,the peace of the subjects within themselves,and their defence against a common enemy.
First therefore,seeing sovereignty by institution is by covenant of every one to every one;and sovereignty by acquisition,by covenants of the vanquished to the victor,or child to the parent;it is manifest that every subject has liberty in all those things the right whereof cannot by covenant be transferred.I have shown before,in the fourteenth Chapter,that covenants not to defend a man's own body are void.Therefore,If the sovereign command a man,though justly condemned,to kill,wound,or maim himself;or not to resist those that assault him;or to abstain from the use of food,air,medicine,or any other thing without which he cannot live;yet hath that man the liberty to disobey.
If a man be interrogated by the sovereign,or his authority,concerning a crime done by himself,he is not bound (without assurance of pardon)to confess it;because no man,as I have shown in the same chapter,can be obliged by covenant to accuse himself.
Again,the consent of a subject to sovereign power is contained in these words,"I authorise,or take upon me,all his actions";in which there is no restriction at all of his own former natural liberty:
for by allowing him to kill me,I am not bound to kill myself when he commands me.It is one thing to say,"Kill me,or my fellow,if you please";another thing to say,"I will kill myself,or my fellow."It followeth,therefore,that No man is bound by the words themselves,either to kill himself or any other man;and consequently,that the obligation a man may sometimes have,upon the command of the sovereign,to execute any dangerous or dishonourable office,dependeth not on the words of our submission,but on the intention;which is to be understood by the end thereof.When therefore our refusal to obey frustrates the end for which the sovereignty was ordained,then there is no liberty to refuse;otherwise,there is.
Upon this ground a man that is commanded as a soldier to fight against the enemy,though his sovereign have right enough to punish his refusal with death,may nevertheless in many cases refuse,without injustice;as when he substituteth a sufficient soldier in his place:for in this case he deserteth not the service of the Commonwealth.And there is allowance to be made for natural timorousness,not only to women (of whom no such dangerous duty is expected),but also to men of feminine courage.When armies fight,there is on one side,or both,a running away;yet when they do it not out of treachery,but fear,they are not esteemed to do it unjustly,but dishonourably.For the same reason,to avoid battle is not injustice,but cowardice.But he that enrolleth himself a soldier,or taketh impressed money,taketh away the excuse of a timorous nature,and is obliged,not only to go to the battle,but also not to run from it without his captain's leave.And when the defence of the Commonwealth requireth at once the help of all that are able to bear arms,every one is obliged;because otherwise the institution of the Commonwealth,which they have not the purpose or courage to preserve,was in vain.
To resist the sword of the Commonwealth in defence of another man,guilty or innocent,no man hath liberty;because such liberty takes away from the sovereign the means of protecting us,and is therefore destructive of the very essence of government.But in case a great many men together have already resisted the sovereign power unjustly,or committed some capital crime for which every one of them expecteth death,whether have they not the liberty then to join together,and assist,and defend one another?Certainly they have:for they but defend their lives,which the guilty man may as well do as the innocent.There was indeed injustice in the first breach of their duty:their bearing of arms subsequent to it,though it be to maintain what they have done,is no new unjust act.And if it be only to defend their persons,it is not unjust at all.But the offer of pardon taketh from them to whom it is offered the plea of self-defence,and maketh their perseverance in assisting or defending the rest unlawful.
As for other liberties,they depend on the silence of the law.In cases where the sovereign has prescribed no rule,there the subject hath the liberty to do,or forbear,according to his own discretion.