Covenants entered into by fear,in the condition of mere nature,are obligatory.For example,if I covenant to pay a ransom,or service for my life,to an enemy,I am bound by it.For it is a contract,wherein one receiveth the benefit of life;the other is to receive money,or service for it,and consequently,where no other law (as in the condition of mere nature)forbiddeth the performance,the covenant is valid.Therefore prisoners of war,if trusted with the payment of their ransom,are obliged to pay it:and if a weaker prince make a disadvantageous peace with a stronger,for fear,he is bound to keep it;unless (as hath been said before)there ariseth some new and just cause of fear to renew the war.And even in Commonwealths,if I be forced to redeem myself from a thief by promising him money,I am bound to pay it,till the civil law discharge me.For whatsoever I may lawfully do without obligation,the same I may lawfully covenant to do through fear:and what I lawfully covenant,I cannot lawfully break.
A former covenant makes void a later.For a man that hath passed away his right to one man today hath it not to pass tomorrow to another:and therefore the later promise passeth no right,but is null.
A covenant not to defend myself from force,by force,is always void.For (as I have shown before)no man can transfer or lay down his right to save himself from death,wounds,and imprisonment,the avoiding whereof is the only end of laying down any right;and therefore the promise of not resisting force,in no covenant transferreth any right,nor is obliging.For though a man may covenant thus,unless I do so,or so,kill me;he cannot covenant thus,unless I do so,or so,I will not resist you when you come to kill me.
For man by nature chooseth the lesser evil,which is danger of death in resisting,rather than the greater,which is certain and present death in not resisting.And this is granted to be true by all men,in that they lead criminals to execution,and prison,with armed men,notwithstanding that such criminals have consented to the law by which they are condemned.
A covenant to accuse oneself,without assurance of pardon,is likewise invalid.For in the condition of nature where every man is judge,there is no place for accusation:and in the civil state the accusation is followed with punishment,which,being force,a man is not obliged not to resist.The same is also true of the accusation of those by whose condemnation a man falls into misery;as of a father,wife,or benefactor.For the testimony of such an accuser,if it be not willingly given,is presumed to be corrupted by nature,and therefore not to be received:and where a man's testimony is not to be credited,he is not bound to give it.Also accusations upon torture are not to be reputed as testimonies.For torture is to be used but as means of conjecture,and light,in the further examination and search of truth:and what is in that case confessed tendeth to the ease of him that is tortured,not to the informing of the torturers,and therefore ought not to have the credit of a sufficient testimony:for whether he deliver himself by true or false accusation,he does it by the right of preserving his own life.
The force of words being (as I have formerly noted)too weak to hold men to the performance of their covenants,there are in man's nature but two imaginable helps to strengthen it.And those are either a fear of the consequence of breaking their word,or a glory or pride in appearing not to need to break it.This latter is a generosity too rarely found to be presumed on,especially in the pursuers of wealth,command,or sensual pleasure,which are the greatest part of mankind.The passion to be reckoned upon is fear;whereof there be two very general objects:one,the power of spirits invisible;the other,the power of those men they shall therein offend.Of these two,though the former be the greater power,yet the fear of the latter is commonly the greater fear.The fear of the former is in every man his own religion,which hath place in the nature of man before civil society.The latter hath not so;at least not place enough to keep men to their promises,because in the condition of mere nature,the inequality of power is not discerned,but by the event of battle.So that before the time of civil society,or in the interruption thereof by war,there is nothing can strengthen a covenant of peace agreed on against the temptations of avarice,ambition,lust,or other strong desire,but the fear of that invisible power which they every one worship as God,and fear as a revenger of their perfidy.All therefore that can be done between two men not subject to civil power is to put one another to swear by the God he feareth:which swearing,or oath,is a form of speech,added to a promise,by which he that promiseth signifieth that unless he perform he renounceth the mercy of his God,or calleth to him for vengeance on himself.Such was the heathen form,Let Jupiter kill me else,as I kill this beast.So is our form,I shall do thus,and thus,so help me God.
And this,with the rites and ceremonies which every one useth in his own religion,that the fear of breaking faith might be the greater.
By this it appears that an oath taken according to any other form,or rite,than his that sweareth is in vain and no oath,and that there is no swearing by anything which the swearer thinks not God.For though men have sometimes used to swear by their kings,for fear,or flattery;yet they would have it thereby understood they attributed to them divine honour.And that swearing unnecessarily by God is but profaning of his name:and swearing by other things,as men do in common discourse,is not swearing,but an impious custom,gotten by too much vehemence of talking.
It appears also that the oath adds nothing to the obligation.For a covenant,if lawful,binds in the sight of God,without the oath,as much as with it;if unlawful,bindeth not at all,though it be confirmed with an oath.