To which I answer that these are indeed great difficulties,but not impossibilities:for by education and discipline,they may be,and are sometimes,reconciled.Judgement and fancy may have place in the same man;but by turns;as the end which he aimeth at requireth.As the Israelites in Egypt were sometimes fastened to their labour of making bricks,and other times were ranging abroad to gather straw:so also may the judgement sometimes be fixed upon one certain consideration,and the fancy at another time wandering about the world.So also reason and eloquence (though not perhaps in the natural sciences,yet in the moral)may stand very well together.For wheresoever there is place for adorning and preferring of error,there is much more place for adorning and preferring of truth,if they have it to adorn.Nor is there any repugnancy between fearing the laws,and not fearing a public enemy;nor between abstaining from injury,and pardoning it in others.There is therefore no such inconsistence of human nature with civil duties,as some think.I have known clearness of judgement,and largeness of fancy;strength of reason,and graceful elocution;a courage for the war,and a fear for the laws,and all eminently in one man;and that was my most noble and honoured friend,Mr.Sidney Godolphin;who,hating no man,nor hated of any,was unfortunately slain in the beginning of the late civil war,in the public quarrel,by an undiscerned and an undiscerning hand.
To the Laws of Nature declared in the fifteenth Chapter,I would have this added:that every man is bound by nature,as much as in him lieth,to protect in war the authority by which he is himself protected in time of peace.For he that pretendeth a right of nature to preserve his own body,cannot pretend a right of nature to destroy him by whose strength he is preserved:it is a manifest contradiction of himself.And though this law may be drawn by consequence from some of those that are there already mentioned,yet the times require to have it inculcated and remembered.
And because I find by diverse English books lately printed that the civil wars have not yet sufficiently taught men in what point of time it is that a subject becomes obliged to the conqueror;nor what is conquest;nor how it comes about that it obliges men to obey his laws:therefore for further satisfaction of men therein,I say,the point of time wherein a man becomes subject to a conqueror is that point wherein,having liberty to submit to him,he consenteth,either by express words or by other sufficient sign,to be his subject.When it is that a man hath the liberty to submit,I have shown before in the end of the twenty-first Chapter;namely,that for him that hath no obligation to his former sovereign but that of an ordinary subject,it is then when the means of his life is within the guards and garrisons of the enemy;for it is then that he hath no longer protection from him,but is protected by the adverse party for his contribution.Seeing therefore such contribution is everywhere,as a thing inevitable,notwithstanding it be an assistance to the enemy,esteemed lawful;a total submission,which is but an assistance to the enemy,cannot be esteemed unlawful.Besides,if a man consider that they submit,assist the enemy but with part of their estates,whereas they that refuse,assist him with the whole,there is no reason to call their submission or composition an assistance,but rather a detriment,to the enemy.But if a man,besides the obligation of a subject,hath taken upon him a new obligation of a soldier,then he hath not the liberty to submit to a new power,as long as the old one keeps the field and giveth him means of subsistence,either in his armies or garrisons:for in this case,he cannot complain of want of protection and means to live as a soldier.But when that also fails,a soldier also may seek his protection wheresoever he has most hope to have it,and may lawfully submit himself to his new master.And so much for the time when he may do it lawfully,if he will.It therefore he do it,he is undoubtedly bound to be a true subject:for a contract lawfully made cannot lawfully be broken.
By this also a man may understand when it is that men may be said to be conquered;and in what the nature of conquest,and the right of a conqueror consisteth:for this submission is it implieth them all.
Conquest is not the victory itself;but the acquisition,by victory,of a right over the persons of men.He therefore that is slain is overcome,but not conquered:he that is taken and put into prison or chains is not conquered,though overcome;for he is still an enemy,and may save himself if he can:but he that upon promise of obedience hath his life and liberty allowed him,is then conquered and a subject;and not before.The Romans used to say that their general had pacified such a province,that is to say,in English,conquered it;and that the country was pacified by victory when the people of it had promised imperata facere,that is,to do what the Roman people commanded them:this was to be conquered.But this promise may be either express or tacit:express,by promise;tacit,by other signs.
As,for example,a man that hath not been called to make such an express promise,because he is one whose power perhaps is not considerable;yet if he live under their protection openly,he is understood to submit himself to the government:but if he live there secretly,he is liable to anything that may be done to a spy and enemy of the state.I say not,he does any injustice (for acts of open hostility bear not that name);but that he may be justly put to death.
Likewise,if a man,when his country is conquered,be out of it,he is not conquered,nor subject:but if at his return he submit to the government,he is bound to obey it.So that conquest,to define it,is the acquiring of the right of sovereignty by victory.Which right is acquired in the people's submission,by which they contract with the victor,promising obedience,for life and liberty.